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Summary  findings
Exchange-rate-based  stabilization  is designed to reduce  in 1979, it was already enjoying  a budget surplus.
inflation  by using  the exchange  rate as the main nominal  Argenina in 1991 was running a small dcficit  - smallcr
anchor.  This does not necessarily  mean  a fixed exchange  than in previous  years, but a deficit.
rate. A crawling  peg with a low rate  of depreciation or a  Perhaps a better explanation is the government's
pre-announced  gradual reduction in the ratc of  perceived  strong commitment  to the fixed  exchange rate
dcvaluation  are alternativc ways  to use the exchange  ratc  and the potential large costs of rcncging  on it. The
as a nominal anchor.  convertibility  law made devaluation  far more difficult
Exchange-rate-based  stabilization  (ERBS)  has been  (requiring  congressional  approval) and reduced the
widely used in the high-inflation  wtonomies  of Latin  chances  of discretionary  devaluations.  And the
America.  Argentina,  Chile, and Uruguay  adopted a pre-  govcrnmcnt  tied its own hands further by legalizing  the
announced  crawling  peg in the late 1970s  (the famous  use of the dollar as unit of account and means  of
tablitas)  to bring  down inflation,  with mixed  results.  Israel  exchange. The costs of abandoning the fixed exchange
and Mexico  used the exchange  rate as a nominal  anchor,  rate were also perceived  to be greater in Argentina.
and inflation  cmnc  down significandy.  More recently,  Devaluation  was (and is) perceived  as opening the door
Argentina  relied  on a fixed and convertible  exchange  ratc  for rcnewed hyperinflation,  a dreadful scenario. Chile
(the convcrtibility  plan) to bring to an end four decades  of  did not face this tihreat  so it was more difficult  - and
inflation.  So  far, the outcomes  have  been  good.  took longer  - to convince  the public that the
Kiguel  and Liviatan  find that ER£SS  havc generally  govemment was determined to maintain the parity.
been more effective  than money-bised programs  in  Governmcnts  tend to stick to the fixed exchange  rate
bringing down inflation in the high inflation ecopwnmies.  longer than is prudent. It is now apparent that some
But when inflation was reduced  gradually, the process  flexibility  at an earlier stage would havc reduced the
resulted in continuous (sometimes  significant)  real  costs of the final failure  of the tablicas.  Why do
appreciation. Even  fixing the exchange  rate in Chile in  govcrnments  find it so difficult to make exchange-rate
1979 did not reduce thc underlying  rate of inflation.  policy more flexible?  Why do they wait for a balance  of
Argentina's  recent  convertibility  plan has been more  payments  crisis rather than anticipate it? Perhaps  because
successful  in bringing  inflation  down significantly  than  they fear the public  will equate flexibility  with failure
previous  money-based  programs  (from monthly  rates of  and a loss  of credibility.
about 10 percent to just 1.5 percent in a few months).  One  Kiguel  and Liviatan  found, however  - in the
could argue that this is a special  case,  since  Argentina  was  experiences  of Israel and Mexico - that inflation does
coming  from fuIll-blown  hyperinflation,  so Kiguel  and  not necessarily  go up when the exchange rate is made
Liviatan  compared the fixed-exchange-race  periods  in  more flzxiblc. Countries  must balance  the necd to
Argentina  and Chile, and came up with  useful  insights.  maintain  an exchange  rate rule (for credibility)  with the
Argentina's  greater success  cannot be explained only  need to keep external balance.
by fiscal  arguments.  When Chile fixed its exchange  rate
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An exchange  rate based  stabilization  is one designed  to reduce
inflation  by using the  exchange  rate  as the  main nominal  anchor.  This does
not mean  necessarily  a fixed  exchange  rate.  A crawling  peg with a low rate
of depreciation  or a preannounced  gradual  reduction  in the rate of
devaluation  are alternative  ways of using the  exchange  rate as a  nominal
anchor.
Exchange  rate based stabilizations  (RBES)  have been widely  used in the
high inflation  economies  of Latin  America.' Argentina,  Chile and  Uruguay
adopted  a pre-announced  crawling  peg in the  late seventies (the  famous
tablitas)  to bring  down inflation  with  mixed results.  Likewise,  Mexico  and
Israel  used the exchange  rate  as a nominal  anchor,  but in these two  episodes
inflation  came down significantly. More recently,  Argentina  relied  on a
fixed  and convertible  exchange  rate (the  convertibility  plan),  to bring to an
end four  decades  of inflation. The  outcomes,  so far,  have been good.
There  are a number  of reasons  that  make the exchange  rate  an appealing
nominal  anchor  for disinflation  in the  high inflation  economies.  First,  the
fixed  exchange  rate played  an important  role  historically  as a way to
mainitain  price stability. Throughout  the  period  of the gold standard  the
fixed  exchange  rate  was  seen  as  the  cornerstone  to  avoid  inflation.  Second,
the  fixed  exchange  rate  is  generally  recognized  as  one  of  the  critical
components  in  those  programs  that  stopped  the  hyperinflations  in  Europe  after
World  War  I,  making  it  a  good  candidate  for  dealing  with  high  inflation  as
well.  Third,  the  exchange  rate,  being  itself  a  price  to  which  the  prices  of
IHigh inflation  economies  are those  with average  annual  rates  of
inflation  between  601k  and 2,0001;  per year, for at least five years.  They are
in  betweenL  moderate  and  hyperinflation.2
tradeable  goods are linked,  was seen as having  a  more direct effect  than
money as an anchor for inflation.  Fourth,  as a nominal target,  the exchange
rate is a  more transparent  nominal  anchor  than money.  The public can readily
monitor the  evolution  of the exchange  rate  as it is  widely and frequently
quoted.  In contrast, information  on money  supply  is not readily  available
and the  public  can not monitor it as well.  In addition,  a change in the
exchange  rate  means a change in  prices (at  least  of tradeable  goods), while
changes in the  money supply  are generally  more difficult to interpret (as
they might reflect  seasonal  patterns,  changes  in money demand,  etc.).
Besides,  there is a common  perception  that money is not an effective
anchor to reduce  high inflation.3 While  there  are many cases  where monetary
targets  have been successful  in reducing  inflation  from moderate to low
levels (e.g.  the U.S. and U.K. in the early  eighties)  or in blocking
hyperinflation (e.g.  Chile  and Argentina  in the  mid-seventies,  and Peru in
early 1990s),  there  are no examples  of countries  that have succeeded  in
reducing  inflation  from  high  to  low levels  relying  on t:ight  money.  Most high
inflation  countries  that  started  stabilization  programs  using  tight  money
quickly  abandoned  them  as  they  either  became  too  costly  (in  terms  of  output
and unemployment)  or they were ineffective  in significantly  reducing
inflation.
-Despite  the  attractiveness  of  using  the  exchange  rate  for  disinflation,
theory  and practice  both  show  that  fixing  the  exchange  rate  is  not  generally
sufficient.  This is clear in  an  economy  with  tradeable  and  non-tradeable
2  Bruno  (1990)  and Fischer (1986)  prcvida a  more  extensive  discussion
of  the  reasons  underlying  the choice  of the exchange  rate as a nominal
anchor.
3  Bruno  (L993):makes  this  point in evaluating  the stabilization
experiences  in  Eastern  Europe.3
good.,  because  the  exchange  rate  can  only  anchor  a subset  of  prices. In
addition,  fixing  the  exchange  rate  is  not  enough  to  change  expectationu,  as
agents  realize  that  if  the  program  is  not  supported  by  changes  in  the  policy
fundamentals  succoes  will  at  best  be  temporary.  For  these  reasons,  fiscal
support  for  the  exchange  rate  based  stabilization  is  essential.  Monetary
policy  is  not  an  effective  instrument  in  this  type  of  programs,  because  it  is
endogenous  with capital  mobility.
This  paper  will  take  a  new  look  the  Argentine  and  Chilean  Tablitas  and
compare  the  results  to  the  more  recent  convertibility  plan  in  Argentina.'
The  objective  is  to  illustrate  three  points:  first,  exchange  rate  based
stabilization  programs  are  generally  more  effective  in  the  high  inflation
economies  than  those  based  on  money,  as  they  reduced  inflation  faster  without
negative  effects  in  the  early  stages  on  output  and  unemiployment.  -In  fact,  in
these  three  episodes  the  authorities  shifted  to  exchange  rate  bused
stabilizations  after  some  disappointment  with  money  based  programs  that
achieved  limited  results  on  the  inflation  front  and  were  costly  in  terms  of
output  and  unemployment.  Despite  their  relatively  larger  success,  exchange
rate  based  stabilizations  rarely,stop  high  inflation  in  its  tracks.
A  second  objective  is  to  show  that  a  sound  fiscal  balance  is  a
necessary,  but  not  sufficient  condition  to  bring  down  inflation  in  ERBS
programs.  Programs  that  failed  to  put  in  place  the  needed  fiscal  adjustment
(such  as  the  Argentine  tablita)  clearly  failed.  But  the  Chilean  program  of
the  late  1970s  also  encountered  big  difficulties  in  bringing  down  inLflation
in  spite  of  significant  fiscal  adjustment,  suggesting  that  non-fiscal  factors
(such  as  the  choice  of  the  exchange  rate  rule  itself)  also  matter  for
'  The  first  two  episodes  have  been  thoroughly  analyzed  in  the  existing
literature.  see  for  example  Foxley  (1993),  Ramos  (1996),  Barletta,  Blejer
and  Landau  (1983),  etc.4
diginflation.  For example,  a  reduction in the rate of depreciation in is too
rapid relative to inflationary  expectations  would lead to a significant  real
appreciation  and the stabilization  effort  would quickly become unsustainable
because of external problems.
The third,  and related  point is that ERBS need to overcome two types  of
credibility  problems: one relates to the sustainability  of the fiscal
balance, an issue that is commonly  mentioned in analytical  and policy
oriented  papers.  The other,  less  understood credibility  problem relates to
the ability of the authorities  to adhere to the announced exchange rate rule
itself.  For example, the  authorities  might have to abandon the policy if
they face adverse external  shocks  and severe  balance of payments problems, or
if the public  does not believe that the authorities  are not willing to
maintain the program if it leads to unemployment  and a significant  loss of
external  competitiveness.
The rest of the paper will be organized as follows.  Section II
describes  the  monetarist  phase  preceding  the  tablitas  in  Argentina  and  Chile.
It shows that  tight  money  was  useful  to  block  incipient  hyperinflations  and
improve the balance of payments,  but that it was  less  effective  in  stopping
high  inflation.  Section III takes one more look at the tablitas in these two
countries,  and  discusses  alternative  explanations  for  the  sluggish  response
of  inflation  and  the  resulting  real  appreciation.  Based  on  these  episodes  it
provides  a  more  positive  evaluation  of  the  usefulness  of  ERRS than  earlier
assessments.  Section IV  presents  the  stabilization  efforts  of  Argentina  in
the 1990s,  which started  with  a money based stabilization  and ended with the
convertibility  plan.  We conclude  in section  V with  a summary of the
findings.5
II. Tight  Money  to Deal  With  Near  Hvoerinflationa
The tablitas  in Argentina  and Chile  were  preceded  by monuy based
stabilization  programs.  In this  section  we highlight  two contrasting
features  of  these  programs:  first,  the  auccess  of  orthodox  money  based
stabilization  programs  in bringing  down inflation  from the  heights  of  a
hyperinflation  outburst  to high levels;  second,  their inability  to bring down
inflation  from  high to moderate  or low  levels.
i.  The  Chilean  E=aeriWent
The Chilean  Stabilization  of 1974-75,  following  the  overthrow  of the
Allende regime,  is one  of the  few  episodes  in which a government  applied  a
fairly  persistent  monetary  crunch  in  the face  of accelerating  inflation
(exceeding  400  percent  per year).  The  program  was a comprehensive  effort
that also attempted  to correct  large  external  imbalances,  raise  public  sector
prices to historical  levels  and  establish  a market  economy  following  a period
of marked  government  intervention. The stabilization  package included  a
drastic cut in the budget  deficit  --  from 30V  of GDP in 1973 to St in 1974
and 2% in 1975--  large  adjustments  in  public  sector  prices  and  a maxi-
devaluation (see  Table 1).
The results  of the fiscal-monetary  phase  in Chile  (where  the  exchange
rate policy  was basically  to maintain  purchasing  power  parity)  were quite
disappointing  regarding  inflation. During  this  phase,  which lasted  from
September  1973 to June 1976,  the  danger  of hyperinflation  was averted.
However,  inflation  which  exceeded  500% per  year  in  1973  did  nct fall  below
200% till the end  of  this  period.  This sluggish  reduction  in  inflation  wasTable  1: CHILE
Indicator  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1971  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983
Percentages
GDP  growth  rate  9.0  -1.2  -5.8  1.0  -12.9  3.5  9.9  8.2  8.3  7.8  5.5  -14.1  -0.7
Unemployment  ()  5.7  3.7  4.8  9.2  16.8  19.4  18.6  17.9  17.7  17.4  15.6  28.2  24.5
Inflation  rate  a/  20.0  74.9  361.5  504.7  374.7  211.8  91.9  40.1  33.4  35.1  19.7  9.9  27.3 M2  growth  rate  85.1  101.3  255.4  322.3  328.1  477.7  NA  NA  NA  62.1  47.9  25.7  27.8
Nominal  devaiu  ()  455.0  549.5  490.3  185.8  84.9  47.0  17.7  4.7  0.0  30.5  54.9
M2/GDP  17.3  18.9  13.7  7.2  5.0  12.8  NA  NA  17.3  20.1  25.1  32.4  32.9
Public  sector
surpluslGNP  (')  -10.7  -13.0  -24.7  -10.5  -2.6  -2.3  -1.8  -0.8  1.7  3.1  1.7  -2.3  -3.8
Current  Account
surpluslGDP  -1.9  -3.9  -2.7  -2.6  -6.8  1.5  -4.1  -7.1  -5.7  -7.1  -14.5  -9.5  -5.1
Indexes
Real  wage  Inde ()  119.3  108.2  80 c  64.8  62.1  63.0  71.1  75.7  82.0  89.4  97.5  97.1  88.8
Real  effective
exchange  rat  ()  91.9  98.4  107.2  93.5  100.2  87.1  84.4  97.7  87.4  75.1  67.4  78.9  83.5
Terms  of trade (h)  80.6  75.5  84.7  58.3  55.4  59.3  54.1  48.6  54.7  51.6  44.6  39.8  40.7
a/ Based  on  CPI
bl Exchange  rate  variations  deflacted  by the  difference  between  extemal  and  intemal  WPI.
c/  January  - August.
Sources:
IFS, World  Bank  and  ()  Ramos  (1986)6
accompanied  by  a dramatic  rise  in  unemployment  (f  rom  4.6%  in  1973  to  16.8t  in
1975)  and  negative  growth,  including  a fall  in  GDP  of 12.9%  in  1975.
Theme  disappointing  results  generated  intense  debates  as  to  whether
money  warn  indeed  tight  in  this  otherwise  orthodox  program.  Harberger  (1381L)
questicon  whether  it  is  possible  to  talk  about  tight  money  when  nominal  money
supply  continues  to  grow  at  high  rates  (exceeding  300%  per  year). In  our
view,  however,  the  relevant  question  is  not  if  money  is  expanding  rapidly  in
nominal  tens, but  whether  monetary  growth  is  contractionary  relative  to  the
underlying  rate  of  inflation.  in  othier  words,  the  key  issue  is  whether
monetary  growth  accommodated  or fought  inflation.
The  data  on  the  ratio  of  M 2 to  GNP  can  throw  some  light  on  this
question.  Table  1  shows  that  this  ratio  fell  dramatically,  froM  14%  of  GDP
in  1973  to  St  of  GDP  in  1975. This  constitutes  indirect  evidence  of  a
monetary  crunch. In  addition.  Corbo  and  Soliumano  (1991)  found  more  direct
evidence  of  the  existence  of  tight  money  during  the  period. They  estimate  a
money  demand  function  for  Chile  and  show  that  during  this  period  there  was
indeed  an  excess  demand  for  money.
Thus,  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  monetary  policy  was  highly  non-
accommodative  from  the  start  relative  to  the  sluggish  inflation.  This  is
also  the  evaluationx  of  Foxley  (1983),  who  attributes  the  recession  whichL
developed  in  1974  towards  the  beginning  of  1975  to  the  foregoing  monetary
crunch  (Focey,  op.  cit.,  p.  53),  and  of  Edwards  and  Edwards,  Jgp-g4it,  pp.
31-33).
In  spite  of  the  monetary  crunch  and  the  reductionL  in  the  budget
deficit,  inflation  stabilized  in  1974  at  around  45%t per  quarter  which  is  an
indication  of  considerable  rigidity.  The  continued  rigidity  of  inflation  in
1975  is  often  attributed  to  the  consequences  of  the  sharp  fall  in  the  price7
of  copper  in  the  end  of 1.974  which  induced  large  devaluations  in  the
beginning  of  1975. But  the  devaluations  were  supported  by  a  significant
fiscal  adjustment  (a  reduction  in  the  primary  fiscal  balance  of  around  30
percent  of  GDP). This  unusually  large  fiscal  adjustment  indicates  that in
principle  there  warn  no  reason  for  the  dev&Iuations  to  slow  down  the  reduction
of inflationA~
Li. Argentina  1976-78
Argentina  had  a brief  experience  with  money  based  stabilization  in  the
mid-seventies,  following  the  overthrow  of  the  Peronist  government.  This  was
the  first  phase  of  what  was  going  to  became  a  longer  term  stabilization
effort  under  economic  minister  Martinez  de  Hoz. The  monetarist-fiscal  stage
lasted  for  approximately  two  years,  starting  in  April  1976.
As in  Chile,  the  stabilization  program  was  initiated  by  an
authoritarian  military  regime  and  stabilization  was  part  of  a  broader
objective  of reducing  government  intervention  in  the  economy. in  addition  to
restoring  price  stability  and  improving  the  balance  of  payments,  the  policies
were  intended  to  undo  much  of  the  damage  on  efficiency  introduced  during  the
Peronist  regime  with  intervention  in  the  financial  markets,  trade  and  other
areas of the economy.
The  stabilization  program  started  on  a strong  foot  and  was  aimed  at
controlling  a  near  hyperinflation  in  the  country.  The  major  fiscal  imbalance
was  addressed  early  on  as  the  government  reduced  the  budget  deficit  from
around  15%  of  GDP  in  1975 to  St  of  GDP  by  1977, a cut  that  was  mainly
The  results  of  this  case  stand  out  in  sharp  contrast  with  the
Bolivian  orthodox  program  that  stopped  hyperinflation.  where  in  spite  of  the
severe  external  shock  during  the  stabilization  (a  collapse  in  tin  prices),
control  over  inflation  was  reestablished  very  rapidly.effected  through  lower  government  expenditurem  (which  fell  from  42%  of  GDP in
1975  to  33%  in  1977). This  was  accompanied  by  a tightening  in  monetary
policy  as  measured  by  the  contraction  in  monetary  aggregate.  as  a share  of
(OP.  T'2  fill  from  15%  of  GOP in  1975,  to  11%  in  1976,  while  domestic  credit
to  the  privats  seotor  fell  from  12%  to  at  during  the  same  period.
The  fiscal-monetary  stage  of  the  M4artinez  de  Rom policies  was  quite
successful  in  reducing  the  rate  of  inflationL  early  on from  500%  to  around
175%  (annual)  with  a relatively  ~mnall  cost  in  tenms  of loss  in  GDP  growth  and
unemployment  (see  Table  3). This  looks  much  more  favorable  than  the  Chilean
experience,  which  put  in  place  a  more  severe  fiacal  adjuitment  and  similarly
corrective  price  increases  for  public  sector  prices  to  undo  the  effect.  of
price  controls.  The  more  succesuful  outcome  in  Argentina  is  in  part
attributable  to  a  better  use  of  the  nominal  anchors  C  including  wage  controls)
applied  during  the  early  stage,  chat  succeeded  in  reducing  real  wage.  from
the  unsustainable  high  levels  of  the  end  of  the  Peronist  period,  a less
distorted  economy  at  the  outset,  and  to  a  more  favorable  external
environment.
The Argentine  experience  suggests  that  fiscal-money  based  programs  can
be  effective  in  arresting  a  near  hyperinflation.  On the  other  hand,  the
success  was  limited  in  the  sense  that  inflation  camne  down only  to  around  175%
per  year,  and  remained  entrenched  at  those  levels.  This  is  certainly  much
less  than  the  authorities  hoped  at  the  time  they  launched  the  program.  So
why  did  we  observe  only  partial  success?
one  possible  interpretation  is  that  the  authorities  were  not  strong
enough  in  pursuing  orthodox  policies.  while  the  deficit  was  reduced  from  the
unsustainable  levels  of  the  Peronist  period,  the  reduction  fell  short  from
what  was  needed  to  restore  price  stability.  Budget  deficits  indeed  persistedTable  2: ARGENTINA
IlndIcator  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1  978  1977  1978  1979  198  1981a  1962  1963
Percentages
GDP  growth  rate  3.5  2.1  3.7  5.4  -0.6  -0.0  6.4  -32  7.0  1-5  4.7  -5.0  29
Unemployment  rate ()  6.0  6.6  5.3  3.4  2.6  4.5  2.8  2.8  2.0  2.3  4-5  4.8  4.0
Inflaton  rate a/  34.5  56.4  62.3  23.2  182.0  444.2  176.0  175.5  159.5  100.8  104.5  164.8  343.8
M2  growth  rate  -0.6  25.1  109.3  74.2  73.8  297.2  251.5  211.A  181.6  127.8  93.4  140.5  297.1
Nominal  devaluaton  ()  146  -5.3  311.2  282.5  191.1  952  65.5  39.5  175.0  360.3  3502
M21GDP  22.4  16.7  20.3  25.9  15.2  11.4  14.5  18.1  18.7  21.5  21.5  192  16.5
Public  sector
surpluslGNP  (4)  -3.1  -3.3  -4.7  -5.3  -10.3  -7.2  -2.8  -3.2  -2.7  -3.6  -8.1  -72  -11.0
Current  Account
surpluslGDP  -1.6  .0.6  1.0  0.1  -3.6  1.2  2.2  2.8  -0.5  -3.1  -3.8  4.1  4.8
Indexes
Real  wage  Index  (C)  103.4  98.3  104.4  117.9  111.1  74.7  73.6  72.3  83.0  92.8  83.0  74.1  90.8
Real  effectve
exchange  rate bI  (C)  94.9  107.3  102.7  87.8  134.2  88.5  114.0  102.9  772  692  87.0  1129  104.1
Terms  of  trade  C')  108.1  117.3  141.8  128.7  97.1  93.1  88.Y  89.9  97.6  110.3  1002  89.1  86.8
aJ  Based  on  CPI
bl  Exchange  rate  variations  deflected  by  the  difference  between  extemal  and  intemal  WPI.
Sources:
IFS  .World  Bank  and  () Ramos  (1  986)at around 4 to 5 percent  per year till the  end of the decade {this  contrasts
with Chile where  the authorities  belanced  the  budget '.ery  quickly).  The
problem with this explanation  is that  deficits  of this size were not unusual
in the  past and they  were associated  with much lower rates of inflation.
This indicates  that an additional  force  was keeping  inflation  alive.
A second  possibility  is  that the  costs  of persisting  with tight  money
were perceived  by the  government  as being  prohibitively  high.  The public, as
a result,  became  convinced  that the  government  *would  not continue  along those
lines,  and that instead  it would start  to accommodate  inflation.  Once these
beliefs  became  widespread.  :t  was difficult  for the  government to continue
with the monetarist  strategy. Basic  data supports  the  view that there was a
relaxation  in  monetary  policy in 1977,  as money  and credit increased  as a
share to GDP.  By 1970, for  example,  credit  to the private  sector  was 14% of
GDP compared  with just 8% in 1976.  Thus, it is very possible that  once
expectations  of high inflation  became  entrenched,  they were an unsurmountable
obstacle for  the  authorities,  which found  it easier  to accommodate  rather
than to fight  them.
i:n. Tablitas  in  Araentina  and  Chile
The dissatisfaction  with the slow  pace of disinflation  under the
fiscal-monetary  package in the  Southern  Cone countries led the authorities  to
switch in the later  part of the 1970S  to an exchange  rate based stabilization
strategy.  we start  with the Argentine  tablita,  where the causes for its
eventual  failure  are relatively  clear,  and  we then shift  to the Chilean10
experience  with the tablita,  where there  is still controversy  regarding  its
short and long  term impact  on inflation.
i.  araentina
On December  20, 1970  the government  announced  an exchange  rate based
stabilization,  the tablita,  showing future  daily exchange  rates.  The Tablita
embodied  a decreasing  rate of devaluation  that  was below the ongoing  rate of
inflation. The objective  was to influence  forward  looking inflation
expectations  by  removing  uncertainty  about  future  exchange  rate  policy.
The  December  20  plan  did  not  include  important  additional  measures  to
supplement  the  new exchange  rate  policy.  There  was no deepening  of the
fiscal  adjustment;  in fact, the  fiscal  situation  slightly  deteriorated  during
those years  as the budget  deficit increased  from 6.5V of GDP in 1978 to 7.6%
of GDP in 1980.  On the other  hand, the central  bank pursued  a policy  of
tight domestic  credit  which  meant that most of the expansion  in money supply
was driven  by changes  in international  reserves.
The outcomes  of this experiment  are widely  documented  in the existing
literature.' Inflation  fell gradually (see  figure  i), from 175% in 1978 to
100I in 1980.  However,  it did  not converge  fast  enough  to the rate of
devaluation (65%  in 1979  and 40% in 1980),  and  as a result  there  was a
significant  real appreciation  during  this  period.  The  current  account
balance,  which  was in surplus  in 1978,  reached  a deficit  of around 3% of GDP
in 1979 and 1980 (as  shown  in table  2).  For  a while this was  not a problem,
because large  capital  inflows  more than compensated  the deficits  in the
current  account,  and  as  a  result  the  central  bank  accumulated  international
reserves.  In  the  end,  however,  these  deficits  became  unsustainable  and  the
'  See  for  example  Ramos  (1986).FIGURE  1
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program  ended in a severe  balance  of payments  crisis  which  was associated
with a  resurgence  of inflation.
Does this failure  provide  strong  evidence  against the use of the
exchange  rate  as  nominal  anchor?  Probably  not,  because  in Argentina the
tablita  was  not accompanied  by  strong  fiscal  discipline.  As  shown  in
table  2,  the  primary  fiscal  balance  deteriorated  during  the  period,  and  the
total  deficit  increased  to  more  than  7t  of  GDP.  These  large  fiscal
imbalances  impaired  the  long  ternm  sustainability  of  the  program.  At  the
minimum,  they  were  inconsistent  with  the  stated  objective  of  rates  of
inflation  at  international  levels.  More  importantly,  they  provided
aamunition  to  the  skeptics  regarding  the  government's  commitment  to
disinflation,  which  argued  that  a  government  that  cannot  eliminate  the  budget
deficit  cannot  be  serious  about  disinflation.
The  Argentine  experience  thus  left  an  open  question:  can  exchange  rate
based  stabilizations  worked  in  cases  where  there  are  no  fiscal  imbalances?
we  now  turn  to  the  Chilean  program  of  1978  to  address  this  question.
ii. ChIle
While  the  Tablita  was  announced  in  Chile  in  early  1978,  some  authors
(e.g.  Ramos  (1986)1  date  the  beginning  of  the  exchange  rate  based
stabilization  period  to  mid-1976,  coinciding  with  the  first  revaluation.  The
appreciation  marks  the  time  when  the  authorities  started  to  view  the  exchange
rate  management  as  an  important  component  of  the  stabilization  strategy.
However,  only  once  the  tablita  was  announced  it  became  clear  the  precise  role
that  the  exchange  rate  played  in  the  stabilization  effort.  The  decreasing
crawl  ended  in  mid-1979  when  the  exchange  rate was  fixed  at  39  pesos  per  U.S.
dollar.12
While quarterly data show that the policy  was eventually successful
in bringing down inflation  to international  levels (see figure  2) it is
noteworthy that this took five years,  with the  decisive period (of  pegging
the exchange rate) lasting two years.  Inflation  fell from 91% in 1977 to 33%
in 1950 and, 9.9% in 1992.  The pace of the reduction of inflation,  hovever,
was disappointing.  In 1979 and 1980  it got stuck at around 35% percenit  per
year, well above international  levels.  The stubbornness  of inflation during
the exchange  rate stabilization  period in Chile was comparable with
Argentina.
The asynchironization  between inflation  and devaluation  over the
adjustment  period led to a real appreciation  of over 30% with respect to 1975
and 20% with respect to 1976.  Towards the end of the stabilization  period
the external  position  deteriorated signxificantly.  The current account
deficit --which averaged 7.5% of GDP during  1978-80--  reac-hed  14% of GDP in
1991.  In the end, as it  became clear that the  policy was unsustainable
capital  started  to  flow  out  and  the  economy  faced  a  balance  of  payments
crisis  which  resulted  in  an  astounding  drop  of  14.2%  in  real  GDP  in  19B2.~
Table  1  clearly  shows  that  this  policy  was  accompanied  by  a  systematic
fiscal  support.  Recent  studies  indicate  that  between  1975  and  1981  the
consolidated  public  sector  ran  surpluses  in  the  primary,  operational  and
overall  balances,  and  that  these  were  remarkably  large  in  1979  and  1.950  (the
overall  surplus  in  1.950  was  6%k  of  GDP) - Thus,  the  eventual  failure  to
maintain  the  exchange  rate  stabilization  cannot  be  explained  by  the  standard
fiscal  argument  along  the  lines;  of  the  Kcrugman  (1979)  model.  We shall
therefore  look  for  alternative  explanations.
7  See  Edwards  and  Edwards  (1-997)  and  Ramos  (1986)  for  a  complete
account  of  this  episode.FIGURE  2
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Asi most  exchange  rate  based  staLbilizations,  the  Chilean  program  ended
in  a  balance  of  payments  crisis,  compounded  with  a  financial  debacle  that  had
serious fiscal  repercussions.  The external environment became  hostile Cb  ith
because of the  debt crisis  and the fall in copper prices) and the economy
faced a severe recession in 1.982  (when  GDP fell by 14%).  Prices did not fall
even under this extreme circumstanLces,  and in the end the government  wasi
forced  to  devalue.
iii. Are Exchancre  Rzate  Based  Stabilizatlons  Exvansionar'fl
Before discussing the reasons for the difficulties encountered  in these
programs it is worth pointing  out some of the ouitcomes  that are common to
other  exchange  rate  based  stabilizations.  As discussed in more detailed in
Kiguel and Liviatan (1992),  ERBS programs tend to display the following
features:
*  There is generally a business cycle which starts with an expansion in
output  in the  early stages  and ends in a recession.  The boom in Argentina
was short lived, and occurred  during the first year of the program (1979)  and
ended  in  a  sharp  recession  in  1981.  The  expansion  in  Chile  lasted  longer  and
was stronger, with GDP growth exceeding  a8 per year on average  betwees  1978
and 1980, and the recession (in  1982-83)  was short but severe.
*  There is a real appreciation  as  inflation  responds  sluggishly  to  the
new  exchange  rate rule.  The real exchange  rate appreciated  quickly  (in just
two  years)  and significantly  by around 45% in Argentina during the program,
and by 25% in Chile over a 4 year period.
*  There :is  a deterioration  in the current account of the balance of
payments  associated  with  the  expansion  in output and the real appreciation.
In  Argentina,  the  current  account  deteriorated  by  5  snercent  of  GDP between14
1979  end 1901,  while ini  Chile it worsened  by 10 percentage  points.
culminating  with a huge current  account  deficit  amounting  to 14 percent of
GDP in 1 92.
The most striking  feature  of these  programs  is that, in contrast  to the
money  based stabilizations,  they were not  recessionary  and they were
associated  with a deterioration  of the  current  account  of the balance of
payments.  Kiguel and  Liviatan (1992)  discuss  alternative  explanations  for
these  outcomes,  attaching  particular  importance  to the one presented  by Calvo
and  Vegh  (1991)  who  argue  that  in  a  non-credible  exchange  rate  based
stabilization  program  agents  anticipate  consumption  leading  to  an  expansqion
early  on followed  by a recession  at a later  stage that coincides  with the
collapse  of the program.
iv. Why the Slu.cish-Response  of Inflation?
The causes  for the slow convergence  of inflation  to the rate of
devaluation  was  and  continues  to  be  a  source  of  debate.  The  Argentine  case
is not very controversial  because  there  was never  a serious and sustained
reduction-of  the budget deficit. But Chile  enjoyed  a fiscal  surplus  durinig
most of the period,  Several  explanations  exist,  and in what follows  we
examine  three of them-
one explanation  offered  for the  sluggish  reaction  of domestic  prices  to
the  exchange  rate  stabilization  in  Chile  was  the  existence  of backwar-d
looking  wage indexation EDornbusch  (1985)  and  Edwards  and  Edwards  (19873].
it  is  easy  to  explain  using this type of model that  indexation  introduces
sluggishness  in domestic inflation,  and  hence slow convergence  to the rate of
devaluation.  Along  the  way  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates,  and  thatca
explain  the  deterioration  in the current  account.--  0  ~~~~~~~~~15
While this  is an appealing  explanation  for the real appreciation  in
Chile, the  rise in real wages  during  the  period  casts  doubt about its
significance  for  the real appreciation. The data on real wages shown in
table 1 implies  that  nominal  wage increases  stayed  ahead  of consumer  prices.
Full  indexation  implies  that  real  wages  remain  essentially  constant,  as
nominal  wage  increases  accompanied  inflation.  So  indexation  could  not  have
been  a  major  force  for the real  appreciation.
An alternative  explanation  for  the  sluggishness  of inflation  in  Chile
is associated  with the li-beralization  of  the  capital  markets  which was part
of the stabilization  policies in the  Southern  Cone.  According to this view,
the opening of capital  markets  to foreign  inflows  constituted  an exogenous
stimulus  to  investment  which led to a domestic  boom.  This  exerted  pressures
on domestic  prices  which slowed  down their  convergence  to the rate of
devaluation (Corbo  (1983)  and  Edwards  and Edwards (1987)].
However  why should  this cause  an overvaluation  of the currency?
Edwards  and Edwards (1987)  suggests  that  the reason is that the flow  of
foreign investment  takes  place  at  a  diminishing  rate  (as  in  stock  adjustment
models).  Therefore  the  initial  increase  in  domestic  prices  represents  an
overshooting. This  leaves,  however,  the  question  of  why  do not domestic
prices adjust  to the  declining  rate of foreign  investment?  The answer  must
rely  on  the  downward  rigidity  of  domestic  prices.
It  should  be  noted  that  in  principle,  as  in  the  Argentine  case,  part  of
the  capital  inflows  themselves  can  be  explained  endogenously.  The  central
bank  adopted  a  policy  of  tight  domestic  credit  which  put  upward  pressures  on
'  There  is  a  subtlety  in  this  argument,  as  a  falling  rate  of  inflation
results  in  increasing  real  wages  with  full  indexation.  However,  this  effect
cannot  explain  the  rise  in  wages  in  Chile  between  1978  and  1980,  as  the  rate
of  inflation  remained  relatively  constant  in  these  years.16
domestic  interest  rates.  Because  inflation  persisted  money demand  increased
pari-passu  with the rise in nominal  GDP.  Capital  inflows,  induced  by high
interest  rates,  became  a mechanism  to accommodate  the increase  in  money
demand.
Edwards  and Edwards (1987)  seems to rule  out this  kind of explanation
because  the Chilean  government  did not permit  short term capital inflows.
However, It is questionable  whether the controls  were in fact effective  given
the sophistication  of the financial  markets  and the  great difficulties  that
are generally  observe in enforcing  regulations  in this area.  The
considerable  difference  between  domestic  interest  rate over Libor plus
devaluation  provided  enough  incentives  to find  ways to sidestep  the
regulations.
A  third  explanation-is  that  t-he  persistence  of  inflation  was  driven  by
lack of credibility  about  the ability  or willingness  of the authorities  to
adhere to the exchange  rate rule in the  event  of  adverse  shocks.  These
credibility  problems  are  different  from  those  resulting  from  the  perceived
unsustainability  of fiscal  policies,  a notion  that  is  much  more  familiar  to
economists.
The  non-fiscal  credibility  arises  because  under  discretion  a  government
can  deviate  from  the  announced  rule.'  The  basic  framework  is  one  where the
government  announces  an  exchange  rate  rule,  but  it  maintains  the  option  (or
discretion)  of reneging  from it if the 'optimal"  rate of inflation  is
different  from the announced  one.  The government  has two objectivres,
reducing  inflation  and  keeping  external  balance  - Deviating  from the
announced  exchange  rate  rule  involves  costs  (i.e.  loss  of  reputation).  The
9  For  a  more  detailed  and  formal  presentation  of  a  model  analyzing  a
similar  issue  see  Cukierman  ,  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1992),  and  Devarajan  and
Rodrik  (1992)  amog  others.17
main benefit of adhering to the rule is that inflation comes down and their
reputation  remains intact.  But when the announcements  are not fully
credible, the reduction in inflation  will be smaller than the reduction in
the rate of devaluation  and hence there is likely to be some real
appreciation.  Under good states  of the world  (i.e.  the external environment
is favorable) the government will adhere to the rule (as  the benefits
outweigh  the  costs).  But  under bad scenarios (e.g.  an  adverse  external
shock)  the  cost  of  the  deterioration  in  the  balance  of  payments  could  well
exceed the benefits of continuing  to adhere to  the  rule,  and  hence  the
authorities  will renege and devalue.
The basic framework can be illustrated  with the help of figure 3. There
are four stages in the decision.  In stage 1,  the government announces an
excharge  rate rule, which balances its  desire to reduce inflation with other
objectives  (such  as  a  target  for  external  balance  or  unemployment).  In  stage
2  the  shock  realizes.  In  stage  3  agents  form  expectations  about  inflation
based  on  the  government's  announcement,  and  on  the  realization  of  the  shock.
But  the  public  does  not  know  how  committed  the  government  is  to  the
disinflation  program,  and hence  a  source  of  uncertainty  remains.  Finally, in
stage  4, the government sets the  policy in order to maximize welfare.
Figure 3
1  2  3  4
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The  ability  of  the  government  to  adhere  to  the  rule depends  or  how
credible  its  announcement  is (i.e.  whether  the  public believes  that it is
serious  about  stabilization)  and  on its  luck regarding  the realization  of the
external  shock.  A  more credible  government  is more likely to be aucceasful
in reducing  inflation. What does  this  interpretation  mean about these two
programs?
An  important  implication  of  the  above  discussion  is  that  even  programs
that succeed  in providing fiscal  support  for disinflation  might  fail  because
the  public  does  not  believe  that  the  authorities  can  maintain  external
balance.  Some real  appreciation  will  occur  if  the  program  is  not  fully
credible,  and  the  program  can  be  maintained  only  if  the  real  appreciation  is
not  strong  enough  or  if  the  external  environment  is sufficiently  good.
In  the  case  of  Chile  the  program  was  not  fully  credible  at  the  outset
and  that  led  to  some  real  appreciation.  Once  the  government  fixed  the
exchange  rate  in  1979  the  program  got  trapped,  because  prices  were  inflexible
downwards. The  pubic realized  that  under the fixed exchange  rate regime
there  was  not an automatic  mechanism  to generate  the real depreciation  to
address  the  increasingly  larger  current  account  deficits.  According  to this
view,  agents  were  not  questioning  the  government's  ability  to  maintain  the
fIscal  balance,  they  were  questioning  its  ability  to  adhere  to  the  exchange
rate  rule  in view of the large  external  deficits.  This was a non-fiscal
credibility  probleu.  In  the  end,  there  was  a  severe  external  shock  (the  debt
crisis)  that  forced  the  abandonment  of  the  regime.
v.  A  auick  Reassessment  of  the  Tab2itas
Early  assessments  of the tablitas  were fairly  negative, as they
emphasized  the  limited  benefits  on  inflation  and  the  large costs  of  the
programs.-t The early facts  certainly  gave room for  skepticism  as both
programs  ended in a balance of payments  crisis,  and severe  recessions.
'o  Diaz Alejandro (1981)  and Foxley (1983)  were among the first  ones to
question  the  viability  of  the strategy  to bring down inflation--;-  ~~~~~~~~~~19
Bemides, the  pronounced real appreciations  that the countries experionced
during this period had damaging, long term effects on the export sactor.  The
real appreciation  was considered  an unwise  coot to pay for disinflation,  and
meant that exchange  rate utabilizationi  were a bad idea.
A new look at these episodes,  with the  benefit of hindsight, provides a
more positive view.  The Chilean experience  is the critical one to derive
lessons from ERBS, because in Argentina the tablita  was never supported by
adequate fiscal  policies.  Such a  view can argue that while there were
problems with the implementation  of the ERBS program in Chile at leart the
period  of the ERBS brought down inflation  on a long term basis.
While  most  Latin  American  countries,  and  all  the  high  inflation  ones,
experienced  a protracted increase in the rate of inflation in the debt crisis
of the early eighties,  Chile maintained inflation  in the moderate levels.
While inflation went up in Chile at the time of the maxi-devaluations  of 1982
and 1983, the increase  was only temporary  as it is  typically the case in low
inflation economies.  The maintenance  of the fixed  exchange rate in the late
1970s under extremely  adverse circumstances  certainly signaled the commitment
of the authorities  to low inflation.  Thus, when the crisis erupted in
1982-83 the public anticipated  that the government  that had invested so
heavily in achieving  price stability  would not tolerate  a rekindle of
inflation.
Of course  the  Chilean  program could  have been carried out better,
especially  with  the  benefit  of  hindsight.  The  output  losses  would have
certainly  been  smaller  if the exchange  rate rule had been flexibilized
earlier.  There  is  little  debate  today  about  this.  And  most  agree  that
automatic  wage  indexation  was  a  policy  mistake.  But  in  the  end,  and  despite
all  the  costs,  Chile  did  manage  to  bring  down  inflation  and  it  had  a
remarkable  growth  performance  in  the  last  decade.
An  interesting  feature  is  that  in  spite  of  widespread  skepticism  about
ERBS,  Mexico  adopted  an  exchange  rate  based stabilization  in  the  1988 and  has
essentially  maintained  it  -with  some  variations  till  the  present-  and20
Argentina  once again  adopted  an ERBS program,  this time relying  on a fully
fixed  exchange  rate.  The  Argentine  episode,  the convertibility  plan, is
probably  more insightful,  because  the  memories  of the  Martinez  de Hoz tablita
were still  fresh.  We now turn  to review  the  why's  and what's  of the
convertibility  plan.
iv.  Is  History  Repeating  Itself?  Argentina  in  the  1990s.
Argentina  in the  1990s  adopted  a major  program  to stop inflation.  This
program  confronted  worse  initial  conditions  than  previous  stabilization
attempts,  as it was fighting  the  first  ever full  blown  hyperinflation. As in
the  previously  discussed  ERBS episodes,  the  disinflation  had two  phases.  It
started  with a money  based  program,  which  blocked  hyperinflation  but failed
to bring about  price  stability  and then shifted  to an exchange  rate based
stabilization,  the convertibility  plan.  The  Convertibility  Program  of  March
1991,  launched  by  Minister  Domingo  Cavallo,  was  the  final  phase  of  the
stabilization  process  under  the  Menem  administration  to bring down inflation
from  hyperinflation  to low  or moderate  levels.
i.  Monetarism  in  the  1990s
The  monetarist  phase  in  Argentina  started  in March,  1990.  This program
followed  two policy  failures:  the first  one  was the  collapse  of a short
lived,  exchange  rate  based  Bunge  & Born  plan.  The second  was the  outbreak  of
the second  hyperinflation  in December  1989,  as the  government  rescheduled  the
domestic  debt and  prompted  a flight  from  domestic  currency.
The  March  1990  program  (siso  known  as  Decree  435)  brought  the
hyperinflation  to  an  end  (figure  4).  The  program  maintained  the  floating
exchange  rate  that  had  been  in  effect  since  December,  and  relied  on  tight
money  and a deeper  fiscal  adjustment  (through  cuts in  subsidies  and  public
employment  as  well  as  some  revenue  enhancing  measures)  to  control  inflation.
The  effectiveness  of the  tight  money-fiscal  combination  in blocking
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to just  11*  in  April.  In the short  run, the  money-fiscal  combination  brought
about  an important  reduction  in  inflation,  but it failed  to reduce  it below  a
basic  rate  of around  10 percent  per month.
During  the tight  money  period  inflation  came down from the  heights  of
hyperinflation,  but this  result  was associated  with poor growth  performance.
As shown  in figure  5.a,  Argentina  did  not  grow in 1990 .
As in other  money based  stabilizations  there  was a sharp  appreciation
in the  real  exchange  rate.  The real  exchange  rate  appreciated  by over 30
percent  in Argentina  during  the  monetarist  phase (figure  5.b).  But the
country  ran  a large  and continuous  surplus  in the trade  balance in spite  of
the  real appreciation  (figure  5.c).  The  deep  recession  in economic  activity
(which  started  at  the  time  of  the  hyperinflation)  can  partly  explain  the
comfortable  trade  balance  position.
ii. The  Convertibility  PrcQram:  The  New Twist in  Exchange  Rate Based
Stabilizations
In  March  1991,  Minister  Cavallo  announced  the  Convertibility  Program  a
far  reaching  attempt  to  bring  down  inflation.  The  Executive  sent to  Congress
and  got  approved  the  Convertibility  law  which  fixed  the  exchange  at  10,000
Australes  per  U.S-  dollar,  included  a  provision  that  any  change  in  the
exchangePrate  had  to  be  authorized  by  law,  and  legislated  that  the  central
bank  could  only  issue  domestic  money  to  buy  foreign  exchange  (credit  to  the
government  was  precluded  in  the  law). A  This  last  component  was  particularly
important  since  it  eliminated,  at  least  in  principle,  the  option  of  the
central  government,  provinces  and  public  sector  enterprises  to  use  the
central  bank  as  the  lender  of  last  resort.
The  circumstances  in  which  the  program  was  launched  provided  a  fertile
ground  for  positive  outcomes.  The  fiscal  situation  was  probably  the  best
Argentina  had  enjoyed  since  the  late  sixties,  when  Krieger  vassena  managed  to
11 There  was  a  loophole  in  the  law,  since  government  dollar  deno  ted
bonds  -- valuated  at  market  prices--  could  be  counted  as  part  of  the  reserves.
However,  the  government  announced  that  this  could  only  amount  to  103lo?)  of
total  holdingsFIGURE  5
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reduce  inflation  to  one  digit.  Despite  many  stops  and  goes  regarding  fiscal
policy  since  the  Austral  plan,  much  had  been  learned  about  the  sources  of
fiscal  and  quasi-fiscal  imbalances,  and  policy  makers  and  the  public  became
convinced  of  the  need  to  eliminate  the  budget  deficit.  Significant
improvements  in  the  fiscal  situation  occurred  under  Minister  Erman  Gonzalez,
including  privatizations  and  other  measures  to  reduce  the  size  of  the  public
sector.  Much progress  was  also  achieved  in  tax  administration  and  in  raising
tax  revenues.  While  these  efforts  were  not  enough  to  achieve  full  price
stability,  they  laid  the  ground  for  the  more  far  reaching  reforms  that  were
undertaken  in  1991.
In  terms  of  outcomes  the  convertibility  program  has  been  quite
successful.  The  strong  adherence  to  the  convertibility  law  (both  in  terms  of
maintaining  the  fixed  exchange  rate  and  in  not  printing  money  to  finance  the
deficit)  was  a  powerful  policy  instrument  to  reverse  inflationary
expectations.  Inflation  came  down  one  step,  falling  from  11* in  March,  to
around  15%  per  month  from  mid  1991  onwards.  In  1993  inflation  was  only  8%,
the  lowest  in  the  last  four  decades.
once  again  we  observed  that  inflation  displayed  significant
persistence,  and  that  the  convergence  process  to  the  rate  of  devaluation  (in
this  case  zero)  was  slow  fit  took  2  years  to  reduce  it  to  one  digit).  Along
the  way  the  real  exchange  rate  has  appreciated  significantly,  rasing
questions  about  the  long  run  sustainability  of  the  program.
But  there  are  some  indications  that  this  programs  is  enjoying  more
credibility  than  previous  ones.  In  contrast  to  most  other  exchange  rate
based  stabilizations,  interest  rates  have  been  remarkably  low  in  Argentina.
Interest  rates  on 7 day  deposits  fell  to  1.5%  per  month  in  April,  and  by
September  they  were  less  than  1%.12  Credibility,  however,  was  not  enough  to
bring  inflation  quickly  to  international  levels.
As  in  most  other  ERES,  we  observe  a  strong  expansion  of  output  from  the
outset  and  a  deterioration  in  the  trade  balance  and  in  the  current  account.
12  Interest  rates  on  30  day  deposits  were  higher,  around  1.5%  per  month.23
This was  accompanied  by an increase  in  economic  activity (as  measured  by
industrial  production>,  and  an appreciation  in the  real exchange  rate.  In
contrast  to the  other  episodes  discussed  in this chapter,  the  real
appreciation  was not accompanied  by a rise in real  wages,  which  in fact
remained  quite  depressed.
The experience  with  the fixed  exchange  rate during  the convertibility
plan confirmed  that the exchange  rate can  be a powerful  nominal  anchor  to
bring  inflation  down.  However,  it also  highlighted  that inflation  could
still display  significant  persistence,  though  at much reduced  levels,  and
hence that  the  economy  is  likely  to experience  a real appreciation  along  the
way.
V.  Final  Remarks
The  evidence  an exchange  rate  based  stabilizations  presented  in  this
paper  indicates  that  they  were  generally  more  effective  than  money  based
programs  in  bringing  down inflation. But the  reductions  in inflation  were
usually  gradual,  and  hence  the  process  resulted  in  a  continuous  (and  in  some
case  significant)  real  appreciation.  Even  the  fixing  of  the  exchange  rate  in
Chile  in 1979  did not succeed  in achieving  a discrete  reduction  in the
underlying  rate  of inflation.
The  recent  Argentine  Convertibility  plan  that  fixed  the  exchange  rate
was  more  successful  in  bringing  down  inflation  significantly  (from  monthly
rates  of  around  10% to  just  1.5%  in  just  few  months).  One  could  argue  that
this is a especial  case,  however,  because  Argentina  was  comriLng from  a  full
blown  hyperinflation.  The  comparison  of  the  fixed  exchange  rate  period  in
Argentina  and  Chile  shows  useful  insights.
Argentina's  relatively  more  successful  experience  can  not  be  explained
on  fiscal  arguments.  When Chile  fixed  the  exchange  rate  in  1979  it  was
already  enjoying  a  budget  surplus.  When Argentina  fixed  the  exchange  rate  in
March  1991,  on  the  other  hand,  the  government  was  running  a  small  budget24
deficit (of  around  2% of GDP).  While this  represented  a significant
improvement  over  previous  years (when  budget  deficits  were as large  as St of
GDP),  it certainly  did  not  go as far  as Chile.
Perhaps  a better  explanation  is the  perceived  government  commitment  to
the fixed  exchange  rate  and the  potential  costs  of reneging  on it.  Argentina
went farther  on the  accompanying  non-fiscal  measures  to support  the  fixed
exchange  rate.  The convertibility  law  made devaluation  much more difficult,
as it  required  congress  approval,  and reduced  the chances  of discretionary
devaluations. Besides,  the  government  tied its  own  hands further  by
legalizing  the  use of the  dollar  as unit of account  and  means  of exchange.
As a result  many prices  of non-tradeable  goods  were denominated  in dollars,
hence  reducing  the  potential  effectiveness  of devaluations  to  change  relative
prices.  In  this  respect  the  commitment  to  the  exchange  rate  rule  in
Argentina  was  stronger  than  in  Chile
The  costs  of  abandoning  the  fixed  exchange  rate  were  also  perceived  to
be  larger  in  Argentina.  The  fixed  exchange  rate  quickly  became  the  pillar  of
a  program  that  neither  the  government  nor  the  public  at  large  were  willing  to
let  it  fail.  A  devaluation  was  (and  still  is)  perceived  as  opening  the  door
for  a  renewal  of  hyperinflation,  a  dreadful  scenario.  The  situation  in  Chile
was  different,  as  the  country  did  not  face  the  threat  of  hyperinflation.  As
a  result  it  took  much  longer  to  convince  the  public  that  the  government  was
fully  determined  to  maintain  the  parity,  even  if  inflation  continued  for  a
whLile.
A  typical  feature  of  exchange  rate  based  stabilizations  is  that  the
authorities  tend  to  stick  to  the  fixed  exchange  rate  for  longer  than  it  might
be  prudent.  In  the  tablitas  it  is  now  apparent  that  some  flexibilization  in
exchange  rate  policy  at  an  earlier  stage  would  have  reduced  the  costs  of  the
finLal  failure. Why do  governments  find  it  so  difficult  to  flexibilize
exchange  rate policy? Why do they  wait for  the balance  of payments  crisis
rather  than  anticipate  it?  one  plausible  answer  is that they fear that  the
public  will  identify  the  flexibilization  with  the  failure  of  the  prcgram.25
once the  exchange  rate moves,  inflation  will rekindle  and the authorities
will lose  credibility  about  announcements. So they  don't devalue.  in the
end, however,  a balance  of payments  crisis  occurs  and this force.  the
devaluation.
The interesting  finLding  is that  inflation  does  not necessarily  goes up
when the  exchange  rate is flrexibilized.  In Chile,  for instance,  the  maxi-
devaluations  of the early  eighties  only  had  a temporary  effect  on inflation,
which  then fell  back to the  moderate  range. Likewise,  the  successful  recent
ERBS  programs  launched  in Israel (1995)  and  Mexico (1987-es)  started  with  a
fixed  exchange  rate  but  later  the  governments  adopted  a  crawling  pe  and  then
an  exchange  rate  band  without  facing  increases  in  inflation.  These  two
recent  episodes  clearly  learned  from  the  experiences  of  the  Southern  cone,  as
they  balance  the  need  to  maintain  an  exchange  rate  rule  (for  credibility)
with  the  one  to  keep  external  balance  (for  external  balance).  3  The  key  to
the  success  of  an  exchange  rate  based  stabilization  program  is  the  ability  to
combine  credibility  and  flexibility,  and  on  this  issiue  the  lesson  was
learned.
"3  See  Cukiermtan,  Kiguel  and  Liviatan  (1992)  for  a  more  detailed
discussion  on  this  topic.26
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